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THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE TO CONDITION ITS CONSENT TO
TREATIES
MICHAEL J. GLENNON*
Neither the President nor the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty, they
are checks upon each other, and are so balanced as to produce security
to the people.
-James Wilson'
Domestic decisionmaking processes in the realm of foreign relations
can yield results that clash with clearly recognized, shared international
expectations. 2 The benefits of multi-branch participation in that process
are familiar: it may help form or strengthen a national consensus; it may
also lessen the likelihood of unpopular policies. 3 But a nation with more
than one governmental hand at the foreign policy helm can incur inter-
national costs in credibility. The hand that signs is not the hand that
delivers; what looks like a good bargain to diplomats at the negotiating
table may look altogether different to legislators in the cold light of con-
stituents' mail.
The tension between these values is particularly evident in the mak-
ing of treaties by the United States, which can be done only with the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate. This paper explores some of the
issues created by this value tension, which is reflected in the making,
interpretation, and termination of international agreements. It begins
with a brief examination of the source of the Senate's constitutional
power to condition its consent to treaties and the origins of recent
changes in that process.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, Law School. Portions of this paper are
adapted from MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (Princeton University Press
1991) (1990).
1. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 507 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863).
2. See generally Warren Christopher, Ceasefire Between the Branches" A Compact in Foreign
Affairs, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 989 (1982); John G. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formula-
tion and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229 (1981/1982).
3. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CON-
GRESS (1979); Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?, 57 FOREIGN AFF.
40 (1978).
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I. CONDITIONING SENATE CONSENT TO TREATIES
The text of the Constitution says nothing concerning the authority
of the Senate to condition its consent to treaties. 4 In this respect the
treaty power is identical to the appointment power: as with treaties, the
constitutional text requires the advice and consent of the Senate for ap-
pointments, but is silent concerning the Senate's power to condition its
consent to appointments. Yet it is now well settled that the Senate lacks
power to condition its consent to appointments but can condition its con-
sent to treaties. 5 Why?
The answer lies in constitutional custom. Chief Justice William
Howard Taft said: "So strong is the influence of custom that it seems
almost to amend the Constitution."' 6 The Senate's power to condition its
consent to treaties dates from Senate approval of the Jay Treaty, with
reservations, in 1798. That power, the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee noted, is part of customary constitutional law in the United States. 7
Recently, concern has arisen in the Senate about the continued via-
bility of that power. In response, the Senate has effectively revised the
method by which it conditions its consent to treaties. A bit of back-
ground may illuminate the sources of that concern and help explain the
new approach.
Following the Senate's consent in 1976 to the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation with Spain a significant disagreement occurred behind
closed doors.8 After transmittal of that Treaty to the Senate,9 the Foreign
Relations Committee (hereinafter alternatively referred to as the "Com-
mittee") held hearings on the international agreement. These hearings
revealed Senate concerns about Spanish progress towards democracy. 10
Consequently, the Committee appended a five-part "declaration" to the
4. The Constitution merely provides that the making of a treaty requires the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)] § 303 cmt. d (1986) (stating that the Senate may condition its consent to a treaty,
provided the condition has a plausible relation to the treaty's content or implementation); Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 133-34 (1972) (stating that the Senate's con-
stitutional right to impose reservations as a condition for consent is universally accepted); 14
MAJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (1970); Margaret A. Rague, Note,
The Reservation Power and the Connally Amendment, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 323, 327 (1978)
(tracing the Senate practice of adding reservations to treaties to the Jay Treaty).
6. Louis FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 36 (1972).
7. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON EXEC. N, S. REP. No. 12, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1978).
8. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Jan. 24, 1976, U.S.-Spain, 27 U.S.T. 3005.
9. S. EXEC. Doc. E, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
10. Spanish Base Treaty: Hearings on Executive E Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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resolution of ratification it reported,"I stating that the Senate "hopes and
intends that this Treaty will serve to support and foster Spain's progress
toward free institutions. .. 12 The Senate later approved the resolution
of ratification as reported by the Committee.13
Several weeks thereafter, the Department of State reported strong
opposition within the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) to the Senate dec-
laration, and indicated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
the Government of Spain would not ratify the Treaty were the Senate
declaration included in the U.S. instrument of ratification. During con-
sultation with various members of the Committee, the State Department
proposed inclusion of the declaration in an annex to the Treaty, to be
incorporated by reference in the instrument of ratification and transmit-
ted simultaneously. ' 4 "Attaching the Senate resolution to the instrument
by means of an annex referred to in the instrument of ratification," the
Department said, "is the equivalent of incorporating the resolution in the
instrument."' 5 The Senators approved, and the Treaty was ratified by the
President.
It was with fresh memories of this episode that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee took up the Panama Canal Treaties. 16 The Com-
mittee appended to each resolution of ratification an "understanding"
that "[t]he President shall include all amendments, reservations, under-
standings, declarations, and other statements incorporated by the Senate
in its resolution of ratification ... in the instrument of ratification ex-
changed with the Government of the Republic of Panama."' 17 The con-
cern in the Senate that the material it had added might be transmitted
separately from the instrument of ratification was understandable: the
requirements of international law concerning treaty ratification, in light
of United States ratification practice, raise serious doubts whether a sepa-
rately transmitted Senate condition would be binding on the other party.
11. S. ExEc. REP. No. 25, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
12. Id.
13. S. Res. 401, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976); see also 122 CONG. REc. 19,390 (1976) (ratifica-
tion vote).
14. For a general discussion of the diplomatic contretemps, see Theodor Meron, The Treaty
Power: The International Legal Effect of Changes in Obligations Initiated by the Congress, in THE
TETHERED PRESIDENCY 103 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981); Panama Canal Treatier Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. v., at 122-23 (1978) [herein-
after Panama Canal Hearings].
15. Letter from Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
to John J. Sparkman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman (undated) (on file with the
author).
16. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 12, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1978) (alluding to concern over the
Spanish Treaty incident).
17. Id. at 10.
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International law, at least as interpreted by the United States Govern-
ment, requires that all reservations and other terms and conditions at-
tached to a nation's ratification of a treaty be formulated in writing and
communicated to the other party or parties to the treaty.18 Traditionally,
the United States has communicated such Senate conditions as a part of
the instrument of ratification,1 9 and it was thought that other nations
might rely on this practice. Given the requirement that the President
make the Senate's qualifications on consent effective if he wishes to bring
the treaty into force,20 it seemed sensible to the Senate that its conditions,
or at least some of its conditions, be incorporated in the instrument of
ratification. 21
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee formally codified these
considerations in its resolution of ratification concerning the SALT II
Treaty.22 The resolution dispensed with the outmoded lexicon of ratifica-
tion law and, instead of using such labels as "amendments, .... reserva-
tions," and "understandings," it set forth three explicit categories of
conditions: (1) those that need not be formally communicated to or
agreed to by the Soviet Union; (2) those to be formally communicated to
the Soviet Union, but need not necessarily be agreed to by it; and
(3) those that would require the explicit agreement of the Soviet
Union.23 This tripartite structure, the Committee noted, "should avoid
18. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations, to John J. Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Jan. 26,
1978), in Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 14, at 49.
19. See Letter from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to Michael J.
Glennon, Legal Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 8, 1979), in 2 UNITED
STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 199 (Michael Glennon & Thomas Franck eds., 1980) [hereinaf-
ter FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 133 cmt. c (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 314 cmt. b.
21. See WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 138-39. See also Memorandum from the Office of the
Legal Adviser of the Department of State to J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee (Mar. 22, 1971), in S. EXEC. REP. No. 5, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1973):
In United States law a condition placed by the Senate on its approval of a treaty-whether
by reservation or by understanding-and included by the President in the instrument of
ratification takes effect as domestic law along with the treaty itself. This is a necessary
result of the shared constitutional role of the President and the Senate in the treaty-making
process.
An instrument of ratification or adherence executed by the President of the United
States sets forth the text of the reservation, understanding, or other instrument as given in
the Senate resolution....
Reservations, understandings, or declarations of intent or interpretation, in order to
have international effect, are incorporated in the case of a bilateral treaty....
22. S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-78 (1979).
23. Id. The committee's chairman, Senator Frank Church, and ranking minority member, Sen-
ator Jacob Javits, previously had received assurances in an exchange of letters with Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance that the President would respect the Senate's wishes on this matter, as expressed in the
resolution. Id. at 31-32.
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the ambiguities and potential misunderstandings inherent in the tradi-
tional designation. ' 24 It continued:
Those designations may still be useful as indicators of a sponsor's in-
tent. But as to whether Soviet involvement is required either through
formal notice or agreement, the designations themselves would not
have to carry the entire weight of indicating the Senate's intentions.
Placement in a particular section of the Resolution of Ratification
should leave no doubt on this score. 25
The new terminology appears to have stuck. During Senate consideration
of the INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty, "condition" seemed to supplant
entirely the old labels of "reservation" and "understanding. ' 26 So, too,
did the three categories of conditions.
II. THE SENATE'S POWER TO REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL
TRANSMITTAL
Section 314 of the Restatement, concerning reservations and under-
standings, provides as follows:
(1) When the Senate of the United States gives its advice and con-
sent to a treaty on condition that the United States enter a reservation,
the President, if he makes the treaty, must include the reservation in
the instrument of ratification or accession, or otherwise manifest that
the adherence of the United States is subject to the reservation.
(2) When the Senate gives its advice and consent to a treaty on
the basis of a particular understanding of its meaning, the President, if
he makes the treaty, must do so on the basis of the Senate's
understanding. 27
Comment b recognizes that the President "must give effect to conditions
imposed by the Senate on its consent." 28 It notes, accordingly, that the
President:
... generally includes a verbatim recitation of any proposed reserva-
tion, statement of understanding, or other declaration relevant to the
application or interpretation of the treaty contained in the Senate reso-
lution of consent, both in the instrument notifying the other state or
the depositary of United States ratification or accession and in the
proclamation of the treaty.29
Without explanation or elaboration, however, the comment then states
flatly that "[t]he President may also communicate a Senate qualification
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id.
26. See generally EXEC. REP. No. 100-15, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988) (INF Treaty).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 314.




The Restatement seems mistaken in permitting such discretion. An
absolute requirement of inclusion in the instrument of ratification is ap-
propriate to ensure identical expectations by both nations concerning
rights and obligations imposed by the treaty. Transmission of material
included by the Senate in its resolution of ratification by means of an
"annex" not incorporated by reference or a diplomatic note only in-
creases the possibility of misunderstanding. This applies even more to
provisions that expressly or implicitly alter provisions of a treaty.
If broader presidential discretion is to be recognized, however, it
should be limited to the authority to exclude from the instrument of rati-
fication only material added by the Senate that in the Senate's view does
not represent a "condition" to its consent to the international obligations
undertaken in the treaty. The President may have the power to transmit
separately from the instrument of ratification a "statement" or "declara-
tion" merely expressing the sense of the Senate and not altering interna-
tional rights or obligations under the treaty. Such authority would
arguably derive from the President's power as "sole organ of the United
States" 3' for the purpose of communicating with foreign governments, a
power long recognized by the Senate.32 The Restatement maintains that
the Senate cannot condition its consent to a treaty upon the firing of a
cabinet officer, 33 presumably on the notion that dismissal is a plenary
presidential power; the same might be said of the power to communicate
with foreign governments 34 or to negotiate treaties. 35 Because conditions
have the same force domestically and internationally as the text of the
30. Id.
31. See infra note 34.
32. See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 12, supra note 16, at 9-10. The President's power in this regard
seems settled. "As 'sole organ,"' Professor Henkin has written, "the President determines... how,
when, where and by whom the United States should make or receive communications, and there is
nothing to suggest that he is limited to time, place, or forum." HENKIN, supra note 5, at 47.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303, cmt. d.
34. But see MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTrUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 3-34 (1991) (discussing the
limits of that power). See also Raoul Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan
Treaty, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 577, 590 (1980).
35. Pursuant to its "advice" power, the Senate clearly can express its sense as to what sort of
agreement it wishes the Executive to negotiate or not to negotiate. In considering the INF Treaty,
for example, the Senate adopted a declaration that, in any subsequent agreement, it "should" be the
position of the United States that no restrictions "should" be established on certain cruise missiles.
134 CONG. REC. S6615 (daily ed. May 25, 1988). While the President may disregard this admoni-
tion, he does so at his peril. The Senate cannot, however, bind the President with respect to future
negotiations. During that same debate, Sen. Jesse Helms offered an amendment, rejected by the
Senate, providing that the United States "shall" be guided by certain principles and considerations in
continued negotiations with the Soviet Union. 134 CONG. REC. S6785 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
Such a restriction, as Sen. Alan Cranston pointed out, would have been unconstitutional. Id. at
S6787.
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treaty, 36 it follows that the same principles apply to the treaty text. The
President and the Senate could not, for example, approve a treaty prohib-
iting a future President from negotiating another treaty on a given sub-
ject. As submitted to the Senate, the Panama Canal Treaty did precisely
that, prohibiting the United States from negotiating with third states
concerning the construction of another canal. 37 The Foreign Relations
Committee recommended, and the Senate adopted, an understanding "to
make clear that the provision may not be construed as precluding a fu-
ture President from exercising his constitutional power to confer with
other governments."'38 (The purpose of the treaty provision, the Commit-
tee believed, was to "ensure that the United States not ... enter into"
such an agreement.39)
Still, the difficulty with discretion so broad is that it either would
cause presidential power to turn on an empty semantic distinction or
would make the President the sole judge of the Senate's substantive in-
tent. It is established that the legal effect of any matter added by the
Senate depends upon its substance, not its denomination.4° But the Presi-
dent, if given this broad latitude, would be empowered to exclude from
the instrument of ratification material intended by the Senate to be in-
cluded 4 l and, conversely, would be required to include material that the
Senate might not have intended to be transmitted. 42 The alternative-
allowing the President to look to the substance of the added material-
creates equally great difficulties in that it increases executive discretion to
36. RFsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 314, cmt. b.
37. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, Sept. 7,
1977, U.S.-Pan., art. XII(2), subpar. (b), T.I.A.S. No. 10,029.
38. EXEC. REPT. 12, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
39. Id. [emphasis in original].
40. WHrEMAN, supra note 5, at 140.
41. See Chapter Seven, GLENNON, supra note 34.
42. The so-called Niagara Reservation could be viewed as such a condition. In 1950, the United
States and Canada reached an agreement governing the use of the Niagara River, designed to protect
the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls and to allow diversion of waters from the river for generation of
hydroelectric power. Convention on Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, U.S.
Can., I U.S.T. 694. The Senate, uncertain as to how the American share of the waters should be
utilized, adopted a "reservation" to the treaty providing that the question would be resolved by an
act of Congress, and that the water would not be utilized in the interim. The Government of Canada
accepted the reservation, and the treaty entered into force. Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and
the Law Makers; The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1155-58 (1956). Congress then
failed to take action on the issue over the next 5 years, a delay that proved too much for "the
energetic Mr. [Robert] Moses of the New York Power Authority," who brought suit to have the
reservation declared null and to have a license for hydroelectric development issued to the authority.
Id. at 1159. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
reservation was not really part of the treaty, as it dealt with a matter of purely domestic concern, and
therefore was not legally enforceable; the Supreme Court, however, vacated the Appeals Court's
judgment. Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as
moot sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
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the point of authorizing the separate transmittal of material that in the
President's exclusive judgment was falsely labeled a "reservation," a for-
mulation of authority that would not comport with traditional United
States ratification practice.43 The better view is thus that the President is
required to communicate a Senate condition as a part of the instrument
of ratification-unless, of course, the Senate expressly waives the
requirement.
Regardless of the position taken by the Restatement on the scope of
presidential authority in the face of Senate "silence," it nonetheless ought
to be clear that presidential discretion is diminished if the Senate con-
sents to a treaty on the express condition that specified material be trans-
mitted with the instrument of ratification, as it did-without objection by
the executive branch-in approving the Panama Canal Treaties.44 Such a
condition (subject to the possible implication of the President's "commu-
nication" power)45 would rest upon approximately the same constitu-
tional footing as a condition providing that the Senate or Congress
participate in the termination process. 46 If the Senate can validly accom-
plish the latter by conditioning its consent to a treaty, as the Restatement
concludes it "presumably" can,47 then presumably it can accomplish the
former as well. Each condition would be "applicable to the treaty before
it" and have a "plausible relation to its adoption. 48
III. EFFECT OF SENATE CONDITIONS
The effect of the inclusion of Senate conditions in the United States
instrument of ratification depends on the response of the other signatory.
43. See WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 138-39.
44. See Chapter Seven, GLENNON, supra note 34.
45. See supra note 34.
46. The question whether the Senate may condition its consent to a treaty by prescribing the
procedure the President must follow in terminating it gave rise to considerable controversy in the
aftermath of President Carter's unilateral termination effective January 1, 1980, of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty between the United States and the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan (Treaty of Mutual
Defense, Dec. 2-10, 1954, U.S.-China, 6 U.S.T. 433). The Department of Justice, relying upon the
President's position as the nation's "sole representative in foreign affairs," argued that the President
alone can determine whether a treaty should be terminated. The Department cited in support the
dictum of Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319, that the President is the "sole
organ" of the United States in foreign policy. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not
accept this view, believing that either the Senate acting alone (by attaching a condition to a treaty) or
the Congress as a whole (by statute) could constitutionally limit the President's authority to termi-
nate a treaty. The committee based its reasoning on the separation of powers analysis in Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case. The American Law Institute supports the
Senate's position in RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339, cmt. a. See generally Michael J.
Glennon, Treaty Process Reform: Saving Constitutionalism Without Destroying Diplomacy, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 84 (1983).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 cmt. a.
48. Id. § 339 reporters' note 3.
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The United States is effectively placed in the position of making a
"counteroffer." ' 49 United States practice is, accordingly, to place the
other signatory on notice of such conditions prior to the exchange of
instruments of ratification.50 Refusal of the other state to exchange in-
struments of ratification constitutes rejection of the treaty.51 Under such
circumstances, the treaty and the Senate's conditions are therefore with-
out effect, both domestically and internationally. If, on the other hand,
the other signatory expressly accepts the Senate's conditions upon ex-
change of the instruments of ratification, both the text of the treaty and
the Senate's conditions take effect internationally and, if the treaty is self-
executing, become the law of the land.
52
Is the other signatory to the treaty, upon exchanging instruments of
ratification with United States representatives, nonetheless bound by
those conditions if it makes no comment regarding the Senate's condi-
tions? That question gave rise to disagreement during consideration of
the SALT II Treaty by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I ad-
vised the Committee that "[i]f the Soviet Union proceeds with the ex-
change of instruments of ratification its silence constitutes assent to the
treaties as modified by the United States."' 53 Eugene V. Rostow, 54 how-
ever, sharply disagreed in testimony before the Committee" and in a
subsequent letter.5 6 "[A] reservation has the same legal effect as a letter
from my mother," he said.57 Elaborating, Professor Rostow suggested
that an amendment to the text of a treaty is of greater legal force than a
49. See, e.g., T. 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 28-29 (1974).
50. WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 138.
51. ELIAS, supra note 49, at 28-29; WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 140-41.
52. As the "supreme law of the land," U.S. treaties enjoy equal status with federal statutes. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has held, however, that insofar as a treaty is a contract, its
duties must be carried out by a political branch of the Government and not by the judiciary. Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Thus, treaty terms requiring legislative action are not
enforced by the courts until Congress has enacted the appropriate legislation.
There is some controversy as to whether a treaty becomes law for domestic purposes on the date
it enters into force or on the date the President formally proclaims it. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 5, § 312 reporter's note 4. The question is of minor importance, as Presidents are generally swift
to issue such proclamations. See id § 312 cmt k.
53. Memorandum from Michael J. Glennon and Frederick S. Tipson to members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (June 25, 1979), in SALT II Treaty: Hearings on Ex Y Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 4, at 23 (1979) [hereinafter SALT II
Hearings].
54. Professor Rostow appeared as chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger, a group
opposed to ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Id. at 1.
55. SALT II Hearings, supra note 53, at 14-15.
56. Id. at 15-17. The letter was also signed by Professor Rostow's Yale Law School colleagues,
Joseph W. Bishop, Robert H. Bork, Leon Lipson, Myres S. McDougal, and William M. Reisman.
57. Id. at 13; see also SALT II Treaty: Hearings on Ex. Y Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 393-94 (1979) [hereinafter Salt II Hearings].
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reservation,5" and that, in any event, "silence would not be
acceptance."
59
Rostow seemed mistaken in his conclusion that the legal effect of
treaty reservations is different from that of amendments. "If a treaty is
ratified or acceded to by the United States with a reservation effective
. . . , the reservation is part of the treaty and is law of the United
States." 6° Rostow's error may have derived from the confusing interface
between principles of domestic ratification law and those of international
law. In domestic law, the Senate may condition its consent to treaties in
either of two ways. It may amend its resolution of ratification by adding
material (normally called a reservation, understanding, interpretation,
declaration, or statement), or it may amend the resolution of ratification
by inserting a condition that the text of the treaty be amended. Strictly
speaking, the Senate does not "amend" the treaty text; it consents to
ratification by the President on the condition that the President amend
the text upon ratification. 61 Each form of alteration is equally binding on
the President, however, if he chooses to exchange instruments of ratifica-
tion. 62 International law, similarly, regards a reservation to a bilateral
treaty as tantamount to a proposed amendment. 63 The principal reason
58. Professor Rostow engaged in the following colloquy with Senator Joseph Biden:
Senator BIDEN. If the reservation is adopted by the U.S. Senate, and the Soviets go
forward with the treaty accepting our stated interpretation-
Mr. ROSTOW. That is the same drama we had in 1972. That is exactly the problem
of the unilateral interpretations in 1972, which were sold to you and the Senate as grounds
for abrogating the treaty. The Soviets paid no attention to our unilateral interpretations,
and we did nothing about it when they were violated.
Senator BIDEN. I am told by counsel that a reservation becomes a full part of the
treaty. Assume that counsel is right that it does, would you have a problem?
Mr. ROSTOW. I made a list of other problems on which we think amendments or reserva-
tions are necessary and I certainly should prefer amendments. I am happy to know that
your counsel thinks that a reservation becomes part of the treaty, and I will be glad to talk
with him about it afterward.
SALT II Hearings, supra note 57, at 393-94.
59. Salt II Hearings, supra note 53, at 14.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 314 cmt. b.
61. See infra note 62.
62. As noted above, the label used by the Senate is legally irrelevant. WHITEMAN, supra note 5,
at 140. Thus, a Senate amendment to its resolution of ratification providing that a given article of the
treaty is without force and effect would be every bit as effective as an actual "amendment to the text"
of that treaty striking the article in question.
63. The use of the terms "amendment" and "reservation" is thus somewhat confusing. As
pointed out above, the Senate cannot itself amend a treaty. Nor can it really enter a reservation;
rather, it can impose, as a condition for its advice and consent, the requirement that the President
enter a reservation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303 reporter's note 3. In either event,
the President must, under international law, return to the other signatory to ask consent to a new
treaty. See id. at 63-65; see also I LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
914 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (calling a reservation "the refusal of an offer and the
making of a fresh offer"); Clive Parry, The Law of Treaties, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
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that the Senate sometimes prefers the "reservation" mode to the "amend-
ment" mode is diplomatic: domestic political considerations in the
nonreserving state may make it easier for its government to accept a
treaty alteration that is cosmetically less glaring.6" Thus the Restatement
defines "reservation" generically as including any "unilateral statement
made by a state when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acced-
ing to an international agreement, whereby it purports to exclude or
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of that agreement in their
application to that state." 65
The question whether nonobjection constitutes tacit acceptance of a
reservation to a bilateral treaty is more difficult. While tacit acceptance
of reservations to multilateral treaties has received considerable atten-
tion, 66 that of reservations to bilateral treaties has not. Principles of con-
tract are analogous. They support the proposition that a reservation to a
bilateral treaty puts the reserving state in the position of rejecting the
treaty and proposing a counteroffer. 67 Contract law also provides insight
into ancillary questions, such as determining when a counteroffer has
been accepted. Principles of contract law would suggest that if the other
state proceeds to the affirmative act of exchanging instruments of ratifica-
tion after having been placed on notice that an alteration is demanded, it
has accepted the counteroffer. Because of the dearth of authority among
traditional sources of customary international law, however, it cannot be
asserted that the matter is free from doubt.
In any event, the question is largely academic because the United
TIONAL LAW 175, 194 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968) (stating flatly that "[a] reservation constitutes a pro-
posal of an amendment of the treaty text").
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties uses the term "reservation" to encompass both
types of Senate conditions, providing in Article 2(lXd) that "'reservation' means a unilateral state-
ment, however phrased or named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that state." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
64. To cite one example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended to the Senate
that changes to the Panama Canal Treaties other than those recommended by the committee itself
not take the form of amendments. S. ExEc. REP. No. 95-12, supra note 16, at 13.
65. RSTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 313 cmt. a.
66. P. Brazil, Some Reflections on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 6 FED. L.
REv. 223 (1975); Jean K. Koh, Comment, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International
Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1982); see generally Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 63. While section 2 of the Vienna Convention is entitled simply "Reservations"-a
shortening of the title "Reservations to Multilateral Treaties" used in an earlier draft-the President
of the Vienna Conference, Professor Ago, said that the change should be understood as reflecting the
fact that all reservations are, by definition, to multilateral treaties, since, strictly speaking, a so-called
reservation to a bilateral treaty constitutes a proposal for a new treaty and not a true reservation at
all. Brazil, supra, at 230-31.
67. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 63, at 194.
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States generally obtains the express acceptance of Senate conditions by
the other party, at least with respect to major bilateral treaties. Both
sides normally sign a protocol of exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion, which spells out the legal effect to be accorded all material in those
instruments and thus effectively binds each party explicitly to any condi-
tions entered by the other.68
The practice of executing a protocol of exchange, up until now a
relatively obscure stage in the process of treaty ratification, can be ex-
pected to gain greater prominence as attention focuses increasingly on
the need for clarity and precision in treaty commitments. The evolution
of the practice was hastened greatly during the Senate's consideration of
the Panama Canal Treaties69 and the SALT II Treaty.70 As noted above,
a condition added to the so-called Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty re-
quired, apparently for the first time, that a protocol of exchange be exe-
cuted and that it include a particular condition.7 1 Curiously, however,
the "inclusion" requirement applied only to that one condition, and not
to other material added by the Senate to the instrument of ratification.7 2
Another question concerns the validity of Senate conditions that
would place the United States in violation of international law. It has
been contended that a condition that violates international law is uncon-
stitutional. Although the argument focuses most directly on the power of
the Senate to condition its consent, the objection necessarily applies to
the original treaty text as well. That is, if the Senate is constitutionally
precluded from insisting that the treaty be changed in a manner that
would breach international law, the same matter, included by the Presi-
dent in the treaty transmitted for Senate approval, should also be consti-
tutionally objectionable.
The theory is unsupported by anything in the constitutional text. No
court has ever adopted it. The Niagara Reservation Case73 did not hold
that the Senate condition in question was invalid under international law,
as acknowledged by the theory's proponents.
Doctrinally, the starting point is the well-settled last-in-time doc-
68. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, supra note 22; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 314 cmt.
b; WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 139. See generally id. at 138.
69. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, Sept. 7,
1977, U.S.-Pan., 33 U.S.T. 1; Treaty on the Panama Canal, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., 33 U.S.T. 39.
70. S. EXEC. Doc. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. (1979).
71. See 124 CONG. REc. 7,187 (1978).
72. Senate Additions to the Panama Canal Treaties, DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2014, May 1978, at
52, 53.
73. Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated sub
nor. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth. of N.Y, 355 U.S. 64 (1957) and remanded.
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trine-the principle that the most recent expression of the law-maker's
will controls. The principle applies with respect to statutes and also with
respect to treaties. The two are interchangeable for last-in-time purposes.
Whether a treaty subsequent in time to a statute-or another treaty-
violates international law is thus, for domestic legal purposes,
irrelevant. 74
Accordingly, if the United States and Japan entered into a treaty
permitting the export of raw ivory from the United States to Japan, the
treaty would violate pre-existing international obligations of the United
States (set forth in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species [CITES]). 75 But no court in the United States would hold the
treaty invalid for that reason. Nor would any United States court inquire
whether the provision in question was contained in the original treaty
text or added as a condition to the Senate's consent. The United States
and Japan would be regarded as violators of international law, yet-
again, for domestic purposes-that would be seen as their choice.
The CITES norm is of course treaty-based, but it would make no
difference if the norm derived from international custom. Suppose, for
example, that customary international law were regarded as requiring
prompt, adequate and effective compensation for expropriated property,
and suppose that the United States and Azerbaijan entered into a treaty
providing that that norm would not apply when property belonging to
nationals of the other is expropriated. Would a United States court find
the treaty invalid because it violates international law? Of course not: this
is how international law evolves. If enough states adopt the new rule, the
old customary norm dissolves and a new one emerges. In the meantime,
the United States and Azerbaijan may be international law violators, but
no court in the United States would decline to enforce the treaty for that
reason-whether it read as it did because the provision was included as a
result of action by the Senate or by the original treaty's negotiators.
Nor would it matter constitutionally whether the treaty was seen as
invalid internationally because it violated peremptory norms. Under
those circumstances, no treaty would exist with respect to the United
States. The "treaty" would not be enforced by the courts, not because it
is unconstitutional, but because the treaty simply is not in force with
respect to the United States. The same conclusion would obtain in other
instances where principles of international law render a treaty ineffectual,
74. See, e.g., Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
75. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T 1087, 12
I.L.M. 1085. See generally Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990).
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such as those precluding a state from becoming a party subject to a reser-
vation that defeats the object and purpose of the treaty. As between the
Netherlands and the United States, the Genocide Convention76 is not in
force-not because the Senate's condition is invalid constitutionally, but
because, as between those two states, the treaty has no force internation-
ally. 77 Nothing exists to constitute "law of the land."
There is, in short, no basis for the argument that the Senate is con-
stitutionally disabled from adding a reservation that violates interna-
tional law. The standard adopted by the Restatement's reporters is
correct: "[A] condition having plausible relation to the treaty, or to its
adoption or implementation, is presumably not improper, and if the Pres-
ident proceeds to make the treaty he is bound by the condition. '78
IV. THE FORM OF THE SENATE'S CONDITION
Does the Constitution require that, if the Senate wishes to condition
its consent to a treaty, it do so in a particular manner? Specifically, must
a condition be express, or can it be implied?
There is little reason to believe that this issue should be resolved
differently from any other issue of statutory construction when the ques-
tion presented is the breadth of presidential power under the law in ques-
tion. It is commonly accepted that executive authority can be limited
expressly or implicitly. In Little v. Barreme,79 for example, the Court
inferred a congressional prohibition against the seizure of a certain class
of naval vessels from a statutory authorization to seize another class of
naval vessels. In the Steel Seizure Case, 0 to cite another example, Justice
Black inferred congressional disapproval of a presidential act (President
Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War) from the
absence of congressional approval; Justice Frankfurter inferred it from
the rejection of approval; and Justice Jackson inferred it from the silence
of Congress concerning seizure in the face of congressional approval of
other means of resolving labor-management disputes. So there is nothing
novel in the notion that Congress can enact implied limitations on presi-
76. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
77. The Netherlands and nine other states have objected to the United States reservations to the
Convention. U.N. SECRETARIAT, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL, at 102-103, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser. E/8, U.N. Sales No. E.90.V.6 (1989) (Status as of Dec.
31, 1989).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 reporter's note 3.
79. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
80. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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dential power, and nothing in the Constitution that requires Congress to
limit presidential power expressly.
There is no reason to believe that different principles of construction
should apply with respect to treaties. The issue arose in connection with
the dispute over interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Senate addressed
the issue in Senate Resolution 167, which provided that
the understanding of the Senate is manifested by any formal expression
of understanding by the Senate, as well as by other evidence of what
the Senate understood the treaty to mean, including Senate approval or
acceptance of, or Senate acquiesence in, interpretations of the treaty by
the executive branch communicated to the Senate .... 81
Conditions imposed by the Senate may thus be explicit-as they are
when formally reduced to express reservations, understandings, or other
statements, or they may be implicit (just to maintain consistency in the
sentence)-as they were in the case of the ABM Treaty, where their con-
tent is to be gleaned from statements by Senators and by administration
representatives in which the Senators present acquiesced. The form of the
Senate's understanding of a treaty's meaning is constitutionally irrele-
vant; it is substance that controls. As Professor Louis Henkin testified
before the Committee:
The President can only make a treaty that means what the Senate un-
derstood the treaty to mean when the Senate gave its consent. That is
indisputable when the Senate has made its understanding plain in the
form of a proposed reservation or explicit understanding. The same
principle governs when the Senate's understanding of a treaty provi-
sion is not expressed in a formal resolution, but is apparent from the
Senate's deliberations leading to its expression of consent.
The Senate's understanding of the treaty to which it consents is
binding on the President. He can make the treaty only as so under-
stood. He cannot make the treaty and insist that it means something
else.82
Professor Henkin addressed directly the question whether the Senate is
required to "formalize" its understanding of a treaty's meaning. He said:
I do not think the formality of a reservation or understanding by the
Senate is a constitutional requirement. The Constitution says nothing
of the kind.
[I think] what the Constitution clearly implies is that [it is] what
the Senate understands the treaty to mean, [that that] is what the
treaty means for purposes of its consent.8 3
81. S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in The ABM Treaty and the Constitu-
tion: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee of
the Judiciary, infra note 87, at 229-42.
82. Id. at 82.
83. Id. at 88.
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It therefore seems entirely sensible to believe, as Senate Resolution
167 indicated, then that if the Senate proceeds to approve a treaty based
on a certain understanding, then that understanding controls.8 4 This is
the rule of section 314 of the Restatement which imposes no requirement
that the Senate's understanding be reduced to a formal condition. It is
reiterated in comment d.s5 A contrary rule would seem illogical: the rea-
son that the understanding in question is not reduced to a formal condi-
tion is that the Senate considers the meaning of the treaty obvious;
formal conditions are appropriate where the meaning is not obvious. The
Reagan Administration's position would have required that the Senate
clarify-indeed, clarify formally, through an explicit condition to its con-
sent-precisely what it is that the Senate views as beyond reasonable dis-
agreement. Normally, of course, the Senate conditions its consent to a
treaty for the purpose of making some change in the treaty; there is no
reason for the Senate to condition its consent to a treaty when it believes
that the treaty's meaning is clear.
V. INTERNATIONAL VERSUS MUNICIPAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Another issue that arose in connection with the ABM Treaty inter-
pretation dispute was whether there is a difference between the extent to
which the executive is municipally bound by the qualification and the
extent to which the executive is bound internationally. The Reagan Ad-
ministration argued to the Senate that United States and Soviet negotia-
tors had a meeting of the minds in 1972, and that the meaning of the
84. Professor Philip Trimble has presented a subtle analysis of the issue arguing that no mean-
ing of a treaty (or law or contract) is forever fixed, but can be changed through presidential initiative
and Senate acquiescence. See Philip R. Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpre-
tation: A Reply to the Formalists, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1467 (1989). First, the approach relied
upon finds Senate acquiescence through a method of inferential reasoning that seems troubling. Pro-
fessor Trimble would require the Congress to reflect its non-acquiescence through its legislative or
appropriations power-necessarily by a two-thirds vote, over the President's veto. Second, Professor
Trimble seems to argue that Congress can be deemed to intend the opposite of any measure that is
merely introduced if only that measure is not approved. This raises serious questions under the
principles of democratic theory that Professors Abbott and Riesenfeld discuss: why should only one
member of the Senate be able, in effect, to control the entire Senate's intent? Third, if a shared
understanding does exist between the President and the Senate at the time of the latter's consent to a
treaty, it is hard to see how violation can have the same effect as amendment. To disregard the
"entrenched," original meaning of a law or treaty merely because a later Senate or Congress declines
actively to object to violation-which is, after all, not its function-would be to invite presidential
lawlessness on a scale foreign to American jurisprudence.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 314 cmt. d reads:
Although the Senate's resolution of consent may contain no statement of understanding,
there may be such statements in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or
in the Senate debates. In that event, the President must decide whether they represent a
general understanding by the Senate and, if he finds that they do, must respect them in
good faith.
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Treaty in force in 1987 was the Treaty on which the negotiators had
secretly agreed-not the meaning described to the Senate in 1972 by Ad-
ministration spokesmen, and not the meaning identified in 1972 by the
two Senate opponents of the Treaty as a reason for voting against it.
It is useful to recall that the a state's domestic obligations under a
given international agreement need not necessarily correspond to its in-
ternational obligations. This principle is clear under customary interna-
tional law, and is of course true with respect to every nation. Perhaps the
best example of an agreement giving rise to disparate obligations within
the two different legal systems is an agreement entered into in violation
of a state's domestic law. Under international law, such an agreement
can be binding internationally notwithstanding the domestic violation.
Indeed, such an agreement is binding internationally unless the agree-
ment violates a "fundamental rule" of domestic law and that violation is
"manifest. '8 6 At the same time, the domestic rule is, ex hypothesi, con-
travened. Domestically, such an agreement is thus void; internationally,
it is binding.
This is important because, during the dispute concerning interpreta-
tion of the ABM Treaty, the State Department Legal Adviser, Abraham
Sofaer, repeatedly cautioned the Senate against endorsing a principle that
would "[deprive] our nation of the benefits of mutuality-of-obligation in
its treaty relations."87 "The United States," the Legal Adviser testified,
"would be put at a significant disadvantage if the President is subject to
stricter constraints, as a result of internal understandings of the Senate,
than those which apply to other parties."88 It is important, he appeared
to suggest, that the Senate not endorse a principle that could result in one
obligation for the United States and another for a treaty partner. This
argument was repeated during the debate on the INF Treaty. 9
Surely all nations have a tidiness interest; it behooves a nation that
takes law seriously to skirt juridical schizophrenia by not readily permit-
ting itself to undertake dissonant domestic and international obligations.
Yet the Legal Adviser seemed wrongly to assume that the possibility of
disparity was some novel idea propounded by a few Senators, rather than
a contingency inherent in the nature of the relationship between the two
86. See Vienna Convention, supra note 63, art. 46, 8 I.L.M. at 697, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. at 890.
87. The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1987)
(statement of Abraham Sofaer, State Dep't Legal Adviser).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., State Dep't Legal Advisor, Abraham Sofaer, Address to the American Law Insti-
tute, in 134 CONG. REc. S6724 (daily ed. May 26, 1988)(stating the Administration's belief that
"only one treaty can exist, the one to which the Senate gives its advice and consent.") Id. at S6742.
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legal systems. Moreover, he seemed wrongly to assume that the interest
in harmony between the two legal regimes is the only interest at stake.
Surely a far greater interest is involved: surely the interest of every
state-and the United States in particular-in preserving the integrity of
the domestic legal order must prevail as against concerns about mere
orderliness. The United States Constitution places limits on the Presi-
dent's power. Whatever international law may say about the interna-
tional nature of an obligation undertaken by the United States, those
limits apply domestically and must be respected unless Congress legis-
lates to change the obligation. If it does so, that statute would control
domestically, although it would not, of course, alter the scope of the
United States' international obligation.
VI. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET TREATIES
None of these considerations relate to the power to interpret trea-
ties, which is a separate and distinct issue. In this realm, both domesti-
cally and internationally, the executive is supreme. The Restatement
notes, correctly, that the President has broad authority to construe the
words of treaties.90 The Senate has no role in the interpretive process.91
Its role has been seen as confined to the advice-and-consent function con-
ferred by the Constitution.92
Yet it is clear that the President's interpretive power is limited. In
approving the INF Treaty,93 the Senate added the so-called "Biden Con-
dition," requiring that the Treaty be interpreted in accordance with the
common understanding shared by the President and the Senate at the
time of its ratification.94 President Reagan gave no indication at the time
90. Section 326(1) of the RESTATEMENT provides that the President "has authority to deter-
mine the interpretation of an international agreement to be asserted by the United States in its
relations with other states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 326(1).
91. Id. reporter's note 1.
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President "shall have power, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur."
93. S. EXEC. REP. No. 100-115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
94. The condition was initiated by Sen. Joseph R. Biden and modified slightly in a technical
amendment by Sen. Robert Byrd when the Treaty was approved by the Senate. It provided as
follows:
The Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the I.N.F. Treaty is subject to the condi-
tion, based on the Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, that:
(1) [T~he United States shall interpret the Treaty in accordance with the common
understanding of the Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate
gave its advice and consent to ratification;
(2) [S]uch common understanding is based on: (A) First, the text of the Treaty and
the provisions of this resolution of ratification; and (B) Second, the authoritative represen-
tations which were provided by the President and his representatives to the Senate and its
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of its consideration that he might elect to disregard it. Nonetheless, fol-
lowing his ratification of the Treaty in Moscow, he seemed to imply that
he would not be bound by it. He said:
[A] condition in a resolution to ratification can [not] alter the alloca-
tion of rights and duties under the Constitution, nor could I, consistent
with my oath of office, accept any diminution claimed to be effected by
such a condition in the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the
Presidency."
Shortly afterwards, the Wall Street Journal 96 and Heritage Founda-
tion 97 launched a critique of the Biden Condition. Their analysis misap-
prehended the substance of the Condition as thoroughly as it did the
requirements of the Constitution.
The Condition was merely a rule of interpretation, governing how
the INF Treaty is to be construed as domestic law. The Condition pro-
vides, as Senate Resolution 167 provided, that the treaty means what the
President tells the Senate it means. If this principle seems self-evident, it
is, and has been for nearly 200 years-until the Reagan Administration
asserted that a President can claim that a treaty means something alto-
gether different than what his representatives told the Senate when it was
approved.
The argument for such presidential authority apparently rests upon
the claim that "the President alone has the right to determine U.S. inter-
national treaty obligations. '"98 This would have confused the Framers,
who seemed to express themselves clearly on the issue: the Constitution
provides that "the President shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur." 99 Pursuant to this shared power, the Senate
since the earliest days of the Republic has conditioned its consent to trea-
ties. It often approves ratification subject to the condition that the Presi-
Committees, in seeking Senate consent to ratification, insofar as such representations were
directed to the meaning and legal effect of the text of the Treaty; and
(3) [T]he United States shall not agree to or adopt an interpretation different from
that common understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent
treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a statute; and
(4) [Ihf, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, a question arises as to the interpreta-
tion of a provision of the Treaty on which no common understanding was reached in ac-
cordance with paragraph (2), that provision shall be interpreted in accordance with
applicable United States law.
134 CONG. REc. S6724 (daily ed. May 26, 1988). The condition was adopted by the Senate by a vote
of 72 to 27. Id. at S6783-84.
95. 134 CONG. REc. S7664 (daily ed. June 13, 1988).
96. Sofaer's Revenge, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1988 at 24.
97. David B. Rivkin, Jr., GOP Must Share Blame for Byrd Amendment, id.
98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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dent change the treaty in one way or another. No President has ever
challenged the Senate's power to do so; as the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has said, that power has become part of "customary constitutional
law" in the United States.' °°
The Senate well might have insisted that the INF Treaty actually be
changed. Instead, the Senate chose a more restrained course; one that did
not endanger the Treaty's ratification. It conditioned its consent upon
adherence to a canon of construction tailored to this specific agree-
ment.101 Rather than inject the Senate into the process of interpretation
that occurs after the Senate's consent, therefore, the Condition simply
shaped the meaning of the document to which the Senate consented. The
President remains free, as he is with all other treaties, to interpret the
INF Treaty to which the Senate consented. But he cannot interpret a
treaty other than the one to which the Senate consented-subject to the
Biden Condition-for to do so would be to make a new treaty. 102
The President was bound, therefore, upon bringing the INF Treaty
into force, to give effect to the Senate's Condition. "[A] condition having
plausible relation to the treaty, or to its adoption or implementation, is
presumably not improper, and if the President proceeds to make the
treaty he is bound by the condition."' 0 3 If the President doubted the va-
lidity of a Senate-added condition, he "would then have to decide
whether he could assume that the Senate would have given its consent
without the condition."' 0 4 He could not assume that the Senate would
have consented to the INF Treaty without the Biden Condition. That the
Condition was just that-a condition on which the Senate based its ap-
100. S. ExEc. REP. No. 12, supra note 16, at 11.
101. That the canon-the Biden Condition-is claimed by the Senate to have constitutional un-
derpinnings seemingly bolsters its validity.
102. President Reagan claimed that "the principles to treaty interpretation recognized and re-
peatedly invoked by the courts cannot be limited or changed by the Senate alone." 134 CONG. REC.
S7664 (daily ed. June 13, 1988). This may or may not be correct, depending upon what principles he
was referring to. Principles concerning ultimate constitutional authority obviously cannot be
changed by Senate condition. The Senate could not, for example, accord itself final say as to the
meaning of a treaty; treaty interpretation is, in the first instance, the task of the President and, in the
end, the job of the courts. But principles concerning the construction of treaty terms clearly can be
governed by Senate conditions. The Senate might provide, for example, that in the event of a conflict
between two treaty provisions, the one specified will govern. Or it might provide by condition that a
certain provision is to be construed broadly, or that a certain term of art will be accorded the same
meaning it has in another treaty. Because the Senate can, in short, alter the meaning of a treaty
provision by requiring modification before presidential ratification, it can also alter that meaning by
imposing a canon that governs how that meaning is derived. The prescribed canon then is merely
another provision subject to presidential interpretative authority.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303 cmt d.
104. Id. reporter's note 4.
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proval-is clear from the report of the Foreign Relations Committee. It
said:
[T]he President may not act upon the Senate's consent without honor-
ing this Condition. Nothing that he or his Administration does, by
statement or action, whether before or after the act of ratification, can
alter the binding effect of any condition which the Senate places upon
its consent to treaty ratification. If the President brings the INF Treaty
into force, the Condition takes effect.105
If President Reagan intended to challenge the wisdom or constitutional-
ity of the Biden Condition, the time to act upon that doubt was before he
ratified the Treaty. After ratification, Mr. Reagan's legal scrutiny might
have been more properly directed to the constitutional requirement that
he "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."0 ° A treaty is a
law, 10 7 and a Senate-added condition is part of a treaty. 10, The President
cannot make an altogether new treaty and dispense with the requirement
of Senate advice and consent by calling that treaty an "interpretation" of
an earlier one. Nor can he amend an earlier treaty and escape the re-
quirement of Senate approval (to what is in reality a new treaty) by call-
ing the amendment an "interpretation."' 09 The President's own semantic
denomination of his act cannot control what procedure constitutionally
is required. Beyond a certain point his authority ends and the Senate's
begins; beyond a certain point an interpretation becomes a new treaty or
an amendment to the old one.
The line between the two is not easy to draw. Senate Resolution 167
drew it in the same place as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties °10 and the Restatement,III both of which indicate that a treaty is to
be construed in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given its terms in light of their context and its object and purpose. When
the President does so, he acts within the scope of his constitutional
power. When his construction of a treaty cannot be so described, it repre-
sents not construction or interpretation at all, but the making of a new
treaty. This he can do only with the advice and consent of the Senate.
105. S. EXEC. REP. No. 100-115, supra note 93, at 100.
106. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
107. The President "is charged with the Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a part
." ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Pacificus, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Har-
old C. Syrett ed., 1969).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 313.
109. "The President's power to terminate an international agreement does not imply authority to
modify an agreement or to conclude a new one in its place." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5
§ 339, cmt. a.
110. See Vienna Convention, supra note 63, art. 31(1), 8 I.L.M. at 691-92, 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. at
885.




President Carter's decision to terminate the mutual security treaty
with the Republic of China brought into question the extent of the Presi-
dent's power to terminate a treaty without Senate concurrence. Can the
President on his own authority end an international agreement that had
the full solemnity of the treaty-making advice and consent of the Sen-
ate?"12 What power has the Senate under the Constitution to control
presidential termination of treaties?
For years, Presidents have opposed congressional proposals to limit
the use of executive agreements to enter into international agreements on
the theory that American credibility would be undermined. 113 But the
tables turned curiously when, upon President Carter's announced intent
to terminate the mutual security treaty, it was members of Congress who
charged the Executive with undermining United States credibility
abroad. 114 Senators previously among the foremost defenders of presi-
dential power suddenly found themselves trying to cut it down to size,"15
supported by legal commentators whose previous works undercut their
new-found adulation for separation of powers. 116 Result-oriented juris-
prudence seldom rode higher.
The matter reached the Supreme Court in 1979 in Goldwater v.
Carter. 17 The Court divided sharply on the propriety of judicial involve-
112. For a recent study of the treaty termination question see DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CON-
STITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES (1986).
113. An example of the Executive's concern arose in 1977, when the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee asked for the Administration's comments on a proposal of Senator Clark's to amend
internal Senate procedure so as to deny funding to an executive agreement which it believes should
be a treaty. The State Department expressed concern "not only that the adoption of such a proce-
dure might become a source of discord between the Senate and the Executive, but that important
international undertakings might be jeopardized because of institutional conflict between the two
Houses." Letter from Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Rela-
tions, to John J. Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Dec. 30, 1977),
reprinted in 1 FOREIGN REL. L., supra note 19, at 455.
114. See, eg., 123 CONG. REC. 28,296 (1977) (speech by Sen. Goldwater opposing unilateral
presidential treaty termination).
115. Compare Barry M. Goldwater, President's Constitutional Primacy in Foreign Relations and
National Defense, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1973) (arguing for presidential leadership in foreign af-
fairs) with Goldwater, supra note 114 (calling presidential treaty termination without congressional
approval unconstitutional).
116. Compare Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presi-
dential Agreement" International Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE LJ. 181, 336 (1945) (af-
firming power of President to terminate treaties with or without prior congressional authorization)
with Treaty Termination: Hearings on S. Rem 15 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 382, 394 (1979) (statement of Professor Reisman to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, on behalf of himself and Professor McDougal, stating that "the President cannot
terminate these treaties on his own initiative, without an authorization") [hereinafter Treaty Termi-
nation Hearings].
117. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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ment in the case. Six justices concluded that the case should be dis-
missed, but failed to agree in their reasoning."1 Oral arguments were
never heard, and only one justice expressed an opinion on the substantive
issues of the case.119 The ambivalence of the Court highlights the diffi-
culty of reconciling domestic political pluralism with reciprocal interna-
tional expectations. 120 Four principal positions shaped the debate. The
State Department argued that the President can abrogate 2 any treaty at
any time. 122 The sponsors of Senate Resolution 15 contended that Senate
consent is required prior to the termination of any mutual security
treaty.1 23 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that the
President could terminate a treaty acting alone, but (1) only in accord-
ance with international law; (2) only if such termination would not "re-
sult in the imminent involvement of United States Armed Forces in
118. Id. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens
in reviewing the question as political and therefore non-justiciable. Justices White and Blackmun
explicitly reserved judgment on the question's justiciability, while Justice Brennan thought that it
was justiciable. Justice Powell thought the question justiciable, but not yet ripe; he preferred to
postpone Court involvement until the potential executive-legislative conflict developed into actual
confrontation. Despite his disagreement with the Rehnquist group on justiciability, Justice Powell
joined them in voting for dismissal, as did Justice Marshall, who gave no reason for his vote. Thus,
although a clear six-vote majority existed for dismissal, the Court was split four-four between those
holding treaty terminations non-justiciable and those refusing so to hold, with Justice Marshall, by
his silence, leaving the deadlock unresolved.
119. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that the President had the
authority to terminate the treaty.
120. No doubt the Court's ambivalence also contributed to the avalanche of commentary on the
subject. See, eg., Raoul Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75
NW. U.L. REv. 577 (1980); Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making
and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Ex-
amined, 55 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1979); Carl I. Gable, Taiwan Relations Act: Legislative Re-Recogni-
tion, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 511 (1979); Barry M. Goldwater, Treaty Termination is a Shared
Power, 65 A.B.A. J. 198 (1979); Louis Henkin, Litigating the President's Power to Terminate Trea-
ties, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 647 (1979); Edward M. Kennedy, Normal Relations with China: Good Law,
Good Policy, 65 A.B.A. J. 194 (1979); Legal Implications of the Recognition of the People's Republic
of China: A Panel, 72 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 240 (1978); Anna M. Pappas, The Constitutional
Allocation of Competence in the Termination of Treaties, 13 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 473 (1981);
Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition of the
Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 931 (1978); Comment, Treaty Termination by the President
without Senate or Congressional Approvak The Case of the Taiwan Treaty, 33 Sw. L.J. 729 (1979);
Comment, Resolving Treaty Termination Disputes, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1189 (1981); Comment, The
Constitutional Twilight Zone of Treaty Termination Goldwater v. Carter, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 147
(1979); Note, Unilateral Termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of
America and the Republic of China Pursuant to the President's Foreign Relations Power, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1979).
121. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its treatment of the issue, used the word "ter-
minate" to refer to treaty denunciations that are authorized by international law, and "abrogate" to
refer to those that are not. This book uses the terms in the same way.
122. Memorandum from the Legal Advisor of the Department of State to the Secretary of State
(Dec. 15, 1978), reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 19, at 377-404.
123. S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) provided: "Resolved, that it is the sense of the
Senate that approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense treaty
between the United States and another nation." Id The Senate never adopted this resolution.
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hostilities or otherwise seriously and directly endanger the security of the
United States;" and (3) only if unopposed by the Congress or the Sen-
ate.' 24 Finally, Justice Brennan, the only member of the Court to address
the issue, found the termination:
a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking govern-
ment, because the defense treaty was predicated upon the now aban-
doned view that the Taiwan government was the only legitimate
political authority in China. Our cases firmly establish that the Consti-
tution remits to the President alone the power to recognize and with-
draw recognition from foreign regimes. 125
Justice Brennan's opinion gave no indication that his conclusion was lim-
ited to treaty terminations authorized by international law.
The Restatement appears to take a position close to that taken by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.' 26
The Restatement provides, in relevant part:
Section 339. Authority to Suspend or Terminate International Agree-
ment: Law of the United States.
Under the law of the United States, the President has the power:
(a) to suspend or terminate an agreement in accordance with its terms;
(b) to make the determination that would justify the United States in
terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation by an-
124. S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1979). The report summarizes the circum-
stances in which, under "customary international law, as reflected generally in the Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 63, a state may terminate a treaty, as follows:
(1) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty;
(2) by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting states;
(3) where it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation
or withdrawal;
(4) where a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the
treaty;
(5) where it appears from a later treaty concluded with the same party and relating to the
same subject matter that the matter should be governed by that treaty;
(6) where the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier
one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time;
(7) where there has been a material breach by another party;
(8) where the treaty has become impossible to perform;
(9) where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances;
(10) where there has been a severance of diplomatic or consular relations and such rela-
tions are indispensable for the application of the treaty;
(11) where a new peremptory norm of international law emerges which is in conflict with
the treaty;
(12) where an error was made regarding a fact or situation which was assumed by that
state to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its
consent to be bound;
(13) where a state has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of
another state; and
(14) where a state's consent to be bound has been procured by the corruption or coercion
of its representatives or by the threat or use of force.
125. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See supra note 124.
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other party or because of the supervening events, and to proceed to
terminate or suspend the agreement on behalf of the United States; or
(c) to elect in a particular case not to suspend or terminate the
agreement. 12
7
Its conclusion thus seems to be that, while presidential treaty "termina-
tion" is permissible, treaty "abrogation" is not; 28 abrogation could not,
for example, have been effectuated with respect to the mutual security
treaty with Taiwan without one year's notice, in accordance with the
terms of article X of that treaty. 29 The comments following section 339
support the view that the President, acting alone, cannot abrogate a
treaty: "The President's power to terminate an international agreement
does not imply authority to modify an agreement or to conclude a new
one in its place. ' 130 "The President's authority to terminate or suspend
international agreements is implied in his office as it has developed over
almost two centuries." The Reporters' Notes, by referring to termination
as opposed to abrogation, are consistent with a denial of presidential ab-
rogation authority. 31 The President's power as "sole organ of the fed-
eral government in the field of international relations," they continue,
".. . would seem to include the authority to decide on behalf of the
United States to terminate a treaty that no longer serves the national
interest.. ",132 Three cases are cited in support: Chariton v. Kelly; 133
La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States;1 34 and Frelinghuysen v.
Key. 135
None of these cases, however, support sole presidential treaty abro-
gation. 3 6 The Supreme Court has never upheld the authority of the
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339.
128. Id.
129. Treaty of Mutual Defense, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-China, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No.
3178.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 cmt. a.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 reporter's note i.
132. Id (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 310 (1936)).
133. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
134. 175 U.S. 423 (1899).
135. 110 U.S. 63 (1884).
136. In Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), Charlton, an American wanted for the murder of
his wife in Italy, argued that the Italian-American extradition treaty was no longer in force due to
breaches by the Kingdom of Italy. The Court held that as the treaty had not been denounced by the
Executive, it was one the courts were obliged to enforce. In La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899), the United States Government had successfully presented La Abra's
claim against the Mexican Republic to an international claims commission. Later, having grounds
to believe the claim had been fraudulent, Congress by statute directed the Executive to return to
Mexico any funds obtained as a result of fraud, even though the treaty establishing the claims com-
mission had said that the commission's decisions would be final. The Court held that it was "the
absolute legal duty of the Secretary of State" to obey the statute, adding, "[ilt was competent for
Congress to impose that duty upon him and he could not refuse to obey the mandate of the law." Id.
at 462. In supporting its reasoning, the Court pointed out that "it has been adjudged that Congress
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President to terminate a treaty lacking a termination clause on the basis
of his sole judgment that it "no longer serves the national interest."1 37
Indeed, in a number of cases it has effectively upheld the authority of the
Congress to control the termination process, at least insofar as that pro-
cess applies to the domestic effectiveness of a treaty (which is, of course,
the only question on which the domestic courts of any country can
rule). 13 The Restatement's unqualified observation that the President
may "elect in a particular case not to suspend or terminate the agree-
ment" 3 9 thus seems questionable.
The Senate rejected the Committee's recommendation, with some
Senators expressing the belief that the fourteen grounds enumerated' 4°
were too extensive.141 In fact, the Committee's enumeration may not
have been sufficiently exhaustive to encompass all circumstances in
which sole presidential action is appropriate. Few would contend, for
example, that congressional approval is required following a judicial de-
termination of a treaty's unconstitutionality; in such an instance, consul-
tation should occur with the Congress, or with the Senate, for the
purpose of determining whether the court's opinion does indeed invali-
date the treaty, and whether amendments to the treaty are desirable.' 42
The reasons advanced for rejecting the approach are illuminating. 43
by legislation, and so far as the people and authorities of the United States are concerned, could
abrogate a treaty made between this country and another country which had been negotiated by the
President and approved by the Senate." Id. at 460. Similarly, Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63
(1884), involved an earlier stage in the La Abra controversy, which dragged on for over thirty years.
President Arthur, concerned that American honor would be tarnished if this country were a party to
perpetrating a fraud on a friendly power, ordered that no further payments be made on the La Abra
claim, pending further negotiations. The Court, taking pains to show that the President's action was
not at odds with the will of Congress, id. at 74-75, held that the President had the discretion to act as
he had "under these circumstances." Id. at 75. While nothing in Frelinghuysen would seem to
derogate from congressional authority, anything in it contrary to the Court's later holding in the
same controversy in La Abra presumably was overruled by the later opinion.
137. U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 229 U.S. 304.
138. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720-21 (1893); The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870). In addition,
one of the cases cited in support of executive authority, La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 423 (1899), actually seems to affirm congressional primacy. Id. at 460.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339(c).
140. See note 124 listing the 14 grounds.
141. See, e.g, 125 CONG. REc. 13,679 (1979) (speech by Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr.).
142. The Justice Department expressed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee its opinion
that "[t]he President cannot amend a treaty in any significant way by means of an executive agree-
ment or parallel declaration of understanding after it has received the advice and consent of the
Senate (unless, of course, the treaty sets forth a procedure for amendment or implementation in that
way.)" Letter from Larry A. Hammond, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Frank
Church, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman (undated), reprinted in Treaty Termination
Hearings, infra note 149, at 217, 220.
143. Those reasons are detailed in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
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First, the argument for congressional primacy grounded on the
Supremacy Clause'" fails on several counts. The argument is that be-
cause treaties, like statutes, are the supreme law of the land, treaties, like
statutes, cannot be terminated by the President alone. But as the Com-
mittee pointed out, treaties are not like statutes in one significant respect:
"[a]lthough the Congress has the last word in determining whether a
statute is enacted, the Senate merely authorizes the ratification of a
treaty; it is the President's role that is determinative."'' 45 The Committee
continued:
[The President] decides at the outset whether to commence treaty ne-
gotiations. He decides whether to sign a treaty. He decides whether to
exchange instruments of ratification after a treaty has been approved
by the Senate. At each of these stages, it is the President who has the
power to determine whether to proceed-and thus whether treaty rela-
tions will ultimately exist. 146
Thus, as was suggested by the United States Court of Appeals, 47 the text
of the Supremacy Clause may fairly be read only as a status-prescribing
provision, not as a procedure-prescribing provision. That it assigns the
same status--supreme law of the land-to each of the instruments de-
nominated does not mean that it commands that the same procedure be
followed in their termination.
Second, there is no reason why the termination of "mutual defense
treaties"-or any other category of treaties, such as those representing a
long-standing United States policy or a policy of supreme national im-
portance-should be seen as subject to different constitutional principles
than all other treaties. None of the constitutional sources of power sup-
ports the contention that one termination procedure applies to one set of
treaties and another termination procedure to another set. As the Court
of Appeals said in Goldwater v. Carter,
[t]here is no judicially ascertainable and manageable method of making
any distinction among treaties on the basis of their substance, the mag-
nitude of the risk involved, the degree of controversy which their ter-
mination would engender, or by any other standards. We know of no
standards to apply in making such distinctions. 148
Byrd Resolution (S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) reprinted in 2 UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 19, at 411-452), its report on the Taiwan Enabling Act, (S.
Rep. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) and the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F. 2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted and dismissal directed, 444 U.S.
996 (1979) which, although vacated by the United States Supreme Court, contains much useful
analysis.
144. U.S. CONS. art. VI, § 2.
145. S. REP. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
146. Id. [emphasis in original].
147. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
148. 617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted and dismissal directed, 444 U.S. 996
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The constitutional text does not address the matter. No Supreme Court
case has reached the merits of the controversy. Although the Depart-
ment of State argued vigorously that historical precedent supported a
plenary presidential power to terminate the mutual security treaty with
the Republic of China, 49 neither the Department nor opponents of that
action even began to address the critical question of opinio juris-the
shared belief of the political branches that the executive practice repre-
sented a juridical norm. It is thus difficult to find any constitutional cus-
tom on the matter; nor does there even appear to exist a practice of treaty
abrogation, which apparently has occurred only once in American his-
tory, in 1798, in connection with treaties of alliance with France. 50 The
intent of the Framers is thoroughly ambiguous. The most reasonable
mode of analysis, therefore, given that the application of all other pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary sources fails to resolve the issue, is to re-
sort to functional considerations.
The issue, thus, is which of the political branches is best suited to
make the determination that the Declaration should be terminated, tak-
ing into account factors such as the need for swiftness versus deliberation
and secrecy versus diverse viewpoints. 51
A functional approach is obviously imprecise, involving a subjective
judgment concerning attributes of the two branches. Yet even the most
cursory consideration would suggest that, viewed functionally, the argu-
ment for excluding Congress (or the Senate) from treaty termination is
weak. The decision to withdraw from a treaty is almost never precipi-
tated by an emergency that requires, say, secrecy or dispatch; such a
decision looms on policy horizons for some months and is one that might
benefit from the ventilation of diverse opinion in congressional hearings
and debate.' 52 What is true of treaty negotiations is in this context
(1979). The Committee, too, doubted that any such distinction is constitutionally supportable. S.
REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1979).
149. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 50 (1979) (testimony of State Dep't Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell).
150. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 310 (1979) (testimony of Prof. Abram Chayes).
151. See Chapter Two of MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990) for a
discussion of the sorts of characteristics to be considered.
152. It has been suggested, for example, that the Panamanian Government has mismanaged
portions of the Canal already turned over to it, and that that mismanagement may constitute breach
of the Treaty, Larry Rohler, Negligence Is Seen in Parts of Canal Ceded to Panama, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1988 at 1. If such breaches did occur and were "material," under international law, the
United States would be permitted to denounce the Treaty. Because the principal performance obli-
gation of the United States-transfer of the Canal to Panama-does not arise until 1999, however,
and because the consequences of denunciation are so grave, involvement of Congress would seem all
the more appropriate.
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largely true of termination as well. "Thus we see," John Jay put it, "that
the constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have
every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integ-
rity, and deliberate investigations on the one hand, and from secrecy and
dispatch on the other."1 3
Functional considerations thus suggest the propriety of some form
of Congressional involvement at some stage in the resolution of the issue.
But these considerations do not imply that initial resolution of the ques-
tion by the President is improper. The act falls within the concurrent
powers of the President. The President has initiative power, while Con-
gress (or the Senate) has reactive power.' 54 Under such an approach, the
best conclusion is that, in the face of congressional silence, treaty termina-
tion by the President does not impinge upon the constitutional preroga-
tives of the Senate or Congress. As Professor Abram Chayes has put it,
"[t]he structure of the overall distribution of the foreign affairs powers,
then, seems, at least on first appraisal, to argue for the existence of an
independent presidential initiative in treaty termination."' 55
This was the approach taken by the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in reporting the Taiwan Relations Act. 56 The Committee there
cited with approval' 57 the tripartite analysis employed by Justice Jackson
in his much-praised concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case.15 8 Af-
ter outlining the three categories, 159 the Committee stated:
Under this formulation, termination by the President of the U.S. -
R.O.C. Defense Treaty would fall within the "zone of twilight" of cat-
egory (2) and the President would, accordingly, appear to possess the
constitutional authority to do so absent any statute enacted by the
Congress or resolution adopted by two-thirds of the Senate directing
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 at 436 (John Jay) (Cooke, ed., 1961).
154. For a similar analysis see Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 149, at 306 (testimony of
Prof. Abram Chayes).
155. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 311 (1979) (testimony of Prof. Abram Chayes). Chayes emphasizes, however, that the
breadth of presidential power is a function of the posture of Congress. "The key question . . . is
whether the President can act on his own in the first instance to give notice of termination without
securing some form of congressional approval in advance. I put aside, once more, the issue of what
he could do in the face of contrary congressional action." Id.
156. 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. 1980).
157. S. REP. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1979).
158. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
159. Under Justice Jackson's analysis, presidential action can be classified into one of three cate-
gories - the first, in which the President's power is at a "maximum," encompassing action pursuant
to congressional authority; the second, the so-called "zone of twilight," encompassing actions re-
garding which Congress has not expressed an opinion; and the third, in which his power is at its
"lowest ebb," encompassing actions taken contrary to the will of Congress. Id., see Chapter One,
GLENNON, supra note 34.
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contrary action: such measures would place the President's action in
category (3). Similarly, his actions would have fallen with category (3)
had the Congress enacted a statute prohibiting him, prospectively,
from terminating a treaty by himself, or had the Senate done so by so
providing in a reservation to the treaty itself or in a two-thirds resolu-
tion....
It appears to the Committee, therefore, that the constitutional
prerogatives of the Congress and the Senate have not been invaded in
that neither the Congress nor the Senate has elected to exercise the
powers granted it by the Constitution to participate in the process of
treaty termination. Had either done so, a different conclusion would
likely obtain. 160
Apparently concerned about the scope of Senate or congressional
power asserted in the last sentence, the Justice Department indicated to
the Committee that a "fundamental error" was found in its discussion of
the Steel Seizure Case, and suggested that treaty termination "is a power
that the President exercises alone":
Whether Congress may act depends on the nature of the President's
independent powers. Jackson cites Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926), in a footnote to this discussion. There... the Constitution is
silent upon removal of executive officers but removal was held to be a
sole presidential power. The Constitution is silent on many points re-
garding foreign affairs but it does not follow that concurrent power
exists. The most obvious is the power to speak for the nation as its
representative in foreign affairs. It is clear that this is a power that the
President exercises alone even though the Constitution does not deal
specifically with the subject. 16 '
The Committee, following enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, next
confronted the issue in the form of Senate Resolution 15. In its report on
the Resolution, the Committee responded as follows:
[I]t cannot accept the notion advanced by Administration witnesses
that the President possesses an "implied" power to terminate any
treaty, with any country, under any circumstances, irrespective of
what action may have been taken by the Congress by law or by the
Senate in a reservation to that treaty. Such an argument in this context
is at odds with the most fundamental precepts underlying the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.... 162
The Restatement takes the position of the Committee. The Report-
ers' Notes observe that the Senate "has not attempted to grant its consent
to a treaty on condition that the treaty be terminable only with its con-
160. S. REP. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979) (emphasis added).
161. Letter from Larry A. Hammond, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Frank
Church, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman (undated), reprinted in Treaty Termination
Hearings, supra note 149, at 217.
162. S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
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sent or in accordance with some other prescribed procedure."' 163 But a
condition "applicable to the treaty before it and having a plausible rela-
tion to its adoption," the Reporters concluded, "would presumably be
valid... and if the President proceeded to make the treaty, he would be
bound by the condition." 164
The position of the Restatement is sound. The Justice Department's
rationale-a textbook example of bootstrapping165-is on close analysis
an undifferentiated argument against the Senate's power to condition its
consent to treaties.166 Such executive branch arguments-laying claim
to sweeping presidential power which would overturn nearly two centu-
ries of historical precedent-ultimately result in an erosion of executive
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 reporter's note 3.
164. Id.
165. The Justice Department argued as follows:
Under our Constitution the power to do the greater, i.e., reject the treaty, does not
necessarily include the power to do the lesser by any means whatever. It is well-settled that
Congress cannot attach an unconstitutional condition to a benefit or power merely because
it has authority to withhold the benefit or power entirely.... For example, Congress could,
if it chose, bar aliens from our shores, but could not admit them under conditions which
deprive them of constitutional rights such as the right to a fair trial.
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). The issue here is very like the question addressed
by the Supreme Court in the Myers Case. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). There the Court made clear that the
existence of an advice and consent power in the Senate did not, by inference, also give the Senate the
power to exert control over the removal of officers once approved. 272 U.S. at 164. Treaty Termina-
tion Hearings, supra note 149, at 217-18 (letter from Hammond, supra note 161). The Department,
of course, is assuming the very point in contention by arguing that the Congress cannot "attach an
unconstitutional condition." Similarly, reference to Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926),
assumes ipse dixit that attachment by the Senate of a termination condition to a treaty is constitu-
tionally on the same footing as an exercise by the Senate of the removal power. Given the conclusion
of the Supreme Court that the treaty power extends to "all proper subjects of negotiation between
our government and the governments of other nations," Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890),
there can be little doubt, as the Committee argued, that a termination procedure would constitute
such a subject. S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong.,lst Sess. 10-11 (1979).
Similarly flawed is the Justice Department's argument that a Senate reservation on treaty termi-
nation relates to a "purely domestic" issue, and is therefore invalid under the Niagara reservation
case, Power Auth. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom.
American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957). The Committee correctly noted
that "it is simply unconvincing to contend that a prospective treaty partner would be uninterested in
how the United States will, internally, go about deciding whether to terminate its treaty obligations."
S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979). The RESTATEMENT, which criticizes the Power
Authority decision, does not support the Justice Department argument. The Reporters noted:
The effectiveness of such a Senate proviso... does not depend on its becoming law of the
land as a part of the treaty. Such a proviso is an expression of the Senate's constitutional
authority to grant or withhold consent to a treaty, which includes authority to grant con-
sent subject to a condition. The authority to impose the condition implies that it must be
given effect in the constitutional system.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303 reporter's note 4.
166. The Committee responded by noting that, since granting conditional approval to the Jay
Treaty in 1795, the Senate has very often granted conditional consent. "No such condition has ever
been held invalid by the Supreme Court, and no President, so far as the Committee is aware, has ever
indicated his intent, upon ratifying a treaty, to disregard a provision upon which the Senate condi-
tioned its consent." S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
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authority. Members of Congress who may be relatively indifferent about
the outcome of a particular substantive issue may nonetheless care deeply
about institutional prerogatives and thus support restrictive measures
merely to establish the principle of legislative precedence.1 67
Restraint is especially appropriate where the Executive is unlikely to
persist in its objection. However willing the executive branch may be to
object in the abstract to a hypothetical Senate condition concerning ter-
mination procedure, it is unlikely to interpose strenuous objections in a
particular case. The reasons are, obviously, political. An indication by a
President that he views a given Senate condition as unconstitutional, or
the suggestion that he will feel free to ignore it, would virtually guarantee
Senate rejection of a treaty.t 68 Three recent significant treaties reported
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-the two Panama Canal
Treaties' 69 and the SALT II Treaty' 70 -were reported with conditions at
least as broad as the termination condition discussed by the Committee
in hypothetical terms during consideration of the treaty termination is-
sue. '7 But none of the conditions to Senate consent to those treaties
generated executive branch opposition, perhaps because they reflected-
and were seen by the executive branch to reflect-legitimate concern in
the Senate for the continued viability of its role in the treaty ratification
process.
The approach outlined above is vastly different from saying that the
President, in terminating a treaty, acts with plenary constitutional power.
To say that would be to exclude Congress and the Senate from a reactive
role. The President's power is not exclusive. Where the Senate specifies
a procedure for termination, the President is compelled constitutionally
to adhere to that procedure. Such a condition normally has the effect,
constitutionally, of placing the President's power at its lowest ebb, for to
terminate a treaty in such circumstances would be in direct opposition to
the express will of the Senate.' 72 Thus the Restatement correctly recog-
167. As discussed above, when the Senate approved the Spanish Base Treaty, Jan. 24, 1976,
United States-Spain, 27 U.S.T. 3005, it included a "declaration" in the resolution of ratification
expressing the hope that the treaty would further the progress of democratic institutions in Spain.
168. Note, in this connection, President Reagan's objections to the "Biden Condition" to the
INF Treaty, discussed earlier in this paper. His suggestion that he might disregard the Condition
was made a week after he ratified the Treaty.
169. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, United
States-Panama, Sept. 7, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 10,029; Treaty on the Panama Canal, United States-
Panama, Sept. 7, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 10,030.
170. S. ExEc.Y. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
171. S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (S. Res. 15, Treaty Termination).
172. See supra note 155. During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on the
Byrd Resolution, the Justice Department took the position that the President's power to terminate
treaties is exclusive. See Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 149 (letter from Larry A. Ham-
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nizes that
[i]f the United States Senate, in giving consent to a treaty, declares that
it does so on condition that the President shall not terminate the treaty
without the consent of Congress or of the Senate, or that he shall do so
only in accordance with some other procedure, that condition presum-
ably would be binding on the President if he proceeded to make the
treaty. 173
As the reporters of the Restatement conclude, notwithstanding occa-
sional suggestions to the contrary 74 such a condition must be given effect
in the constitutional system even though it arguably is solely of domestic
import.' 75
If the Senate can prescribe a specific termination procedure as a con-
dition to its consent to a given treaty, there is no reason to believe that
Congress could not prescribe such a procedure by statute. This was the
position taken by the Committee in its report on the Byrd Resolution. 7 6
Nor is there any reason to believe that a statute overturning the transmit-
tal of a given notice of termination would be ineffective, at least if it were
enacted before the effective date of the notice of termination. 77 It, too,
would place the President's power at lowest ebb. Although this proce-
dure would "deal in" the House of Representatives on the treaty power,
not all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were
troubled. 78
mond to Frank Church, Chairman, arguing that "(i]t is clear that this is a power that the President
exercises alone even though the Constitution does not deal specifically with the subject"). On close
analysis the Justice Department position is little more than an undifferentiated argument against the
Senate's power to condition its consent to treaties. See S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12
(1979); Michael J. Glennon, Treaty Process Refonm Saving Constitutionalism Without Destroying
Diplomacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 84, 96-97 (1983).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 cmt. a.
174. See Power Authority v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C.Cir. 1957), vacated
as moot sub nom., American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 5, § 303 reporter's note 4. Whether this particular
condition would in fact be of purely domestic concern is of course doubtful, and the practical utility
of the test is questionable. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers" The Niagara
Power Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 151 (1956).
176. S. REP. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979).
177. Under international law, such an instrument may be revoked at any time before it takes
effect. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 64 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/
27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States has taken
the position that a notice of termination may be withdrawn at any time before its effective date. See
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REv. 497, 550 (1967); In re Air Crash in Bali, 684 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
In the absence of a specific time period provided in the treaty, a party is required to give not less
than twelve months' notice of its intention to terminate a treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 63,
at art. 56, para. 2.
178. Some Senators expressed their feelings as follows:
THE CHAIRMAN. Congress can pass a law prescribing how either a given treaty can be
terminated or a class of treaties. If the President joins in it, that, then, has the force of law.
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This approach does not mean that the congressional power to direct
the withdrawal of a given notice of termination is without constitutional
limits. Such a directive may not interfere with the exercise of one of the
President's specific plenary powers. Congress could not, for example,
lawfully have overturned President Carter's notice of termination of the
mutual security treaty with the Republic of China because such a law
would have interfered with the President's plenary power to recognize
and de-recognize foreign nations; a formal treaty relationship with a state
is inconsistent with the status of non-recognition.
Just as Congress's concurrent power to react is not unfettered,
neither is the President's concurrent power to initiate without limits.
The power to initiate a given treaty termination, it must again be empha-
sized, exists only when the President acts pursuant to legislative approval
or in the face of legislative silence. He may not initiate the termination of
a treaty if that action is prohibited by law or by treaty. Treaty termina-
tion is therefore different, constitutionally, from treaty abrogation. A
treaty is terminated when it is brought to an end in accordance with its
terms. A treaty is abrogated when it is brought to an end in violation of
its terms. In the case of abrogation the Senate has, in effect, explicitly
stated its opposition to the President's act by expressing its advice and
consent to a term of the treaty-its termination clause-which the Presi-
dent has disregarded. His power is then at its lowest ebb. Accordingly,
the Restatement recognizes presidential power to terminate but not to
If the President vetoes it, then the Congress can override the President's veto and it will
still have the force of law.
Senator SARBANES. Is it clear to you that a treaty can be terminated over the opposition
of the President?
Senator JAVITS. By law.
THE CHAIRMAN. By law .... We are saying if the Congress passes a joint resolution
over the President's veto, then he should not terminate that treaty. He would be inviting
trouble. But I would take it a step further. I would hazard that if the Congress overrode a
veto with a joint resolution which, under the Constitution, would have the force of law, the
congressional position would be upheld in the courts as a constitutional proposition. I
think I can make an awfully persuasive case for that position.
Mr. HENKIN. You are right, Senator. But I think one might distinguish general termi-
nation procedures from a particular agreement. I think the emphasis ought to be on partic-
ular agreements where Congress can make a special case. Then you avoid the rigors of that
stark confrontation.
Sen. SARBANES. I agree with that point .... If you make the joint resolution general,
then what you are doing is dealing in the House of Representatives on the treaty powers in
a role on which I think some question can be raised as to whether it is an appropriate role
for them.
Mr. GLENNON. I would point out that this, in effect, establishes a procedure not only for
the repeal of treaty provisions but for the repeal of Senate reservations, as well, by a major-
ity of the Senate acting in concurrence with a majority of the House and the President.
THE CHAIRMAN. If by the passage of a law that is inconsistent with a provision of a
treaty, the treaty or the reservation can be undone, then it seems to me that it follows that a
direct repeal should also be a valid way to undo a treaty provision.
S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 40-41 (1979).
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abrogate a treaty,1 79 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its
report on the Byrd Resolution, recognized presidential power to initiate
the ending of a treaty only when permitted by international law. 80
The distinction between termination and abrogation is therefore im-
portant constitutionally because treaty termination is permitted by inter-
national law whereas treaty abrogation is not. The customary norm of
pacta sunt servanda, under which treaties are binding upon parties and
which requires that they be performed by the parties in good faith, 81 is
violated when a treaty is abrogated. This norm has been called the glue
that holds the international system together, and it is binding upon the
President as a matter of domestic law.' 82
Very different principles thus apply to the question of treaty abroga-
tion. The issue of abrogation arose in connection with the 1984 modifica-
tion'8 3 of the 1946 Declaration by which the United States accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ").184
It also arises in connection with the seventy-some treaties that confer
jurisdiction on the International Court in accordance with article 36(1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 8 5 The Executive's
abrogation of the 1946 Declaration on October 7, 1985, raised the possi-
bility that some of these jurisdictional provisions might also have been
the subject of termination efforts. If such review had taken the form of
renegotiation of the treaty in question and if renegotiation had led to that
treaty's termination, the principles discussed herein would have applied:
treaty termination in accordance with its terms and in the face of con-
gressional silence would place the President's act, constitutionally, in
Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight."
If on the other hand the parties had agreed merely to an amendment
to the treaty in question, a very different issue would have been raised.
The constitutional power of the President to effect an amendment is far
more limited than his power to carry out complete termination. This
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339.
180. S. REP. No. 96-119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (President may initiate the termination
process in any of the fourteen situations permitted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties).
181. See Vienna Convention, supra note 63, at art. 56.
182. See Chapter Seven, GLENNON, supra note 34.
183. See generally Michael J. Glennon, Nicaragua v. United States: Constitutionality of US.
Modification of ICI Jurisdiction, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 682 (1985).
184. 61 Stat. 1218 (1947).
185. Article 36(1) provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court comprises all ... matters spe-
cially provided for.., in treaties and conventions in force." See generally Morrison, Treaties as a
Source of Jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice with Special Reference to the Practice of
the United States ofAmerica, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lri
F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
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was acknowledged by both the Department of State'8 6 and the Depart-
ment of Justice' 87 during the dispute concerning termination of the mu-
tual security treaty with Taiwan. Although not addressed directly by the
Restatement the reasoning seems implicit in the proposition that "[t]he
President's power to terminate an international agreement does not im-
ply authority to modify an agreement or to conclude a new one in its
place." " Were the President to amend an agreement on his own, he
would in effect be terminating an old agreement and entering into a new
one.
Perhaps for reasons such as these, the Reagan Administration made
no effort to negotiate across-the-board removal of provisions in treaties
providing for the adjudication of disputes by the ICJ under its compul-
sory jurisdiction. Indeed, it earlier had apparently recognized that treaty
amendment lays beyond the scope of the President's sole authority. In
announcing that the United States would not sign the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, 89 President Reagan enumerated its "unacceptable ele-
ments" and said the United States wanted a treaty that would "[n]ot
allow for amendments to come into force without approval of the partici-
pating states, including, in our case, the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate." 9° "IT]his is clearly incompatible with the United States approach
to such treaties," the President later said. 191 These concerns were reiter-
ated by Ambassador James Malone, who complained that the Conven-
tion allowed for the adoption of amendments in a manner that
"effectively bypass[es] U.S. approval, including congressional [sic] advice
and consent." 192 The Executive had thus declined to argue that it was
possessed of plenary power to amend a treaty in violation of its terms.
Such a power would vitiate the Senate's right to approve a treaty condi-
tionally: under such an argument, any Senate-added reservation-to-
gether with any other unwanted provisions---could be unilaterally
removed by the President. For similar reasons, the constitutional ration-
ale proffered by representatives of the Department of State to justify the
1984 modification of the 1946 Declaration is unpersuasive. They argued
that although the President cannot amend a treaty so as to expand
186. Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 149.
187. Id. at 220-221.
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 339 cmt a.
189. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
reprinted in The Law of the Sea:" United Nations Convention and the Law of the Sea, U.N. Sales No.
E.83V.5 (1983).
190. 82 Dep't St. Bull., Mar. 1982, at 54.
191. 82 Dep't St. Bull., Aug. 1982, at 71.
192. 82 Dep't St. Bull. Oct. 1982, at 49. See also 82 Dep't St. Bull., May 1982, at 62 (similar
statement by Ambassador Malone).
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United States liability, he may constitutionally amend a treaty so as to
constrict United States liability.
First, the argument creates false categories. It is easy to hypothesize
an amendment that does neither. The oft-mentioned (before termination
of the Declaration) possibility of an amendment which would have
"traded" the Connally Reservation 93 for a "use of force" or "political
question" exception is a good example; who can say whether the net ef-
fect of such an amendment would have been to expand or to constrict
United States liability? Under this "test" the amendment process be-
comes an extended excursion into casuistry.
Second, even if one can distinguish the two categories, the assump-
tion that a compact formally approved by the Senate can be caused to
take an entirely new and different form without any Senate or legislative
approval still has no constitutional basis. If the Senate were to condition
its consent to a treaty upon an increased United States liability, by what
authority might the President disregard the Senate's action? The power
of the Senate to grant its conditional consent to a treaty, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee noted in 1978, is part of customary constitu-
tional law in the United States.194 Surely there is no constitutional basis
for distinguishing between Senate conditions and "original" treaty text
for purposes of presidential amendment authority.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The real objection of some commentators is not to the specifics of
Senate participation in the treaty-making process-such as its power to
approve a condition violative of international law, or its power to ap-
prove only the treaty presented to it by executive-branch negotiators-
but rather to the treaty-making process itself set out in Article II, section
2, clause 2 of the Constitution. Their real, often unstated concern is that
that process is undemocratic. Theories of democracy abound, but one
need not delve deeply to suppose that the requirement of treaty approval
by a super majority of two-thirds is indeed undemocratic. If the Consti-
tution were drafted today we might reflect long and hard whether Sena-
tors representing only seven percent of the population-the 17 least
populous states--ought to be able to defeat a treaty or to impose a condi-
193. I.C.J. Statute, art. 36(2)(b) (The Connally Amendment allows the United States to deter-
mine which disputes are within its domestic jurisdiction.).
194. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON EXECUTIVE N. S. REP. No 12,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1978).
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tion on their consent. Perhaps approval by a majority of both Houses, or
of only the Senate, would make more sense.
But that is not what the Constitution requires. The rule of law does
not permit us to redefine constitutional requirements to reflect "modem"
notions of democracy. If the Constitution is to be made more democratic
by altering law-making or treaty-making procedures set out in explicit
text, that text must be amended by the process prescribed by the Consti-
tution itself in Article V.
Before we take out the blue pencils we might remind ourselves that
those who wrote its words were not strangers to democratic thought.
The treaty clause itself has deep roots in democratic theory. Alexander
Hamilton-no wallflower on the subject of presidential power-consid-
ered it "utterly unsafe and improper" to entrust the power of making
treaties to the President alone. 195 The requirement of two-thirds Senate
approval is directed at ensuring that significant international commit-
ments undertaken by the United States have the overwhelming support
of the American people. We have learned, to our sorrow, that when sig-
nificant national commitments are made without the support of the peo-
ple, the results can be tragic and costly, in systemic legitimacy as well as
human life.
The temptation is ever present to side step domestic requirements
concerning treaty approval-the diplomatic benefits are on occasion un-
deniable. On such occasions it may be well to recall the words of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The constitutional role of the Congress has too often been short-cir-
cuited because it was viewed-in the executive branch and even by
some members of Congress-as an impediment to the expeditious
adoption of substantive policies commanding the support of a major-
ity. Thus, when in our recent history the substance of those policies
lost that support, the procedures once available as checks had
atrophied, and the Congress was forced to struggle to reclaim its pow-
ers. The lesson was learned the hard way: procedural requirements
prescribed by the Constitution must not be disregarded in the name of
efficiency, and the substance of a policy, however attractive, can never
justify circumventing the procedure required by the Constitution for
its adoption.' 96
195. See supra note 107.
196. S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5-6 (1979) (treaty termination).
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